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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
The objective of this study is to assess the capital market effects of the implementation of 
the new revenue standard, Accounting Standard Codification (ASC) 606, Revenue from 
contracts with customers.1 More specifically, I examine whether implementation of the standard 
affects liquidity and the channels through which it occurs. Because the former revenue standard 
was used in conjunction with numerous pieces of authoritative industry- and transaction-specific 
guidance, firms often accounted differently for economically similar transactions, thereby 
reducing financial statement comparability among firms (Financial Accounting Standards Board 
(FASB) 2014). To improve comparability among firms, the FASB issued the new revenue 
recognition standard that requires all firms to follow the same five-step recognition process, 
regardless of industry or transaction type. 
I examine the capital market effects of the new revenue standard for at least three 
reasons. First, revenue is an important measure of firm health and performance that is scrutinized 
by investors and regulators. Second, the new revenue standard had a large effect on financial 
reports of many firms and the potential capital market effects of the standard are, therefore, 
widespread. Third, because the cost of implementing the new revenue standard was substantial, 
                                                 
1 ASC 606 is the codification of Revenue from contracts with customers, Accounting Standard Update (ASU) 2014-
09. I refer to the ASU and its codification as the “new revenue standard” throughout the paper. 
 
2 
estimated to be $3.3 million on average for public and private companies, it is important to 
address whether investors benefited from the new revenue standard.2  
Evidence suggests that liquidity is a key construct to assess the capital market effects 
(Bhattacharya et al. 2012; Lang et al. 2012; Holden et al. 2014). Furthermore, theory suggests 
that the implementation of standards can increase liquidity and that the increase in liquidity is 
associated with an increase in firm value and investment efficiency. Because of these reasons, I 
examine the liquidity effect of the new revenue standard, even if this is not an explicit objective 
of standard setter.  
The new revenue standard is effective for firms with fiscal year-ends beginning after 
December 15, 2017, including interim periods. Because firms implemented the standard at 
different times, I use a staggered difference-in-differences design to examine the liquidity effect 
of the implementation of the standard. Using several proxies for liquidity, I find that the 
implementation of the new revenue standard increases liquidity. I also show that firms that 
implement the standard first experience an increase in liquidity relative to firms that implement 
the standard at later dates and that this liquidity difference decreases as more firms implement 
the standard. This liquidity difference is insignificantly different from zero once all firms 
implement the standard. I also perform additional analyses to increase confidence in the 
inference that the implementation of the standard increases liquidity.  
Analytical work suggests that the implementation of accounting standards affects 
liquidity through two channels (Barth et al. 1999; Gao et al. 2019). The first is a change in 
precision, where precision is the accounting report’s ability to reflect economic events. The 
                                                 




second is a change in comparability, where an increase in comparability results in financial 
reports reflecting the same economic events more similarly to enable users to identify and 
understand similarities in, and differences among, recognized amounts. Because an increase 
(decrease) in precision or comparability can lead to an increase (decrease) in liquidity, the net 
effect of these two channels on liquidity is an empirical matter that depends on the relative 
effects of changes in precision and comparability. How these channels affect liquidity is 
potentially relevant to standard setters because creating a standard that increases comparability 
(precision), but decreases precision (comparability) could have undesirable capital market effects 
by decreasing liquidity. 
First, I find that both precision and comparability increase after the implementation of the 
new revenue standard. I also show that both of these characteristics are positively correlated with 
liquidity. I also find no increase in either characteristic in the year prior to the implementation 
year and perform additional analyses, such as assessing the construct validity of the proxy for 
comparability and employing alternative estimation procedures when calculating the proxy for 
precision. Second, I show that firms that experience an increase in precision or comparability, or 
both, experience an increase in liquidity, but firms that experience an increase in neither do not. 
Third, using path analysis, I show that both the precision and comparability channels contribute 
to the increase in liquidity associated with implementation of the standard.  
I contribute to the literature in various ways. First, I provide early evidence on the capital 
market effects of the implementation of the new revenue standard. Specifically, I show that 
liquidity increases when firms implement the standard. Second, I provide evidence that the 
precision and comparability channels are the channels through which the implementation of the 
standard increases liquidity. I also show that increases in precision or comparability are 
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associated with increases in liquidity and that firms that experience an increase in neither 
precision nor comparability do not experience an increase in liquidity. Furthermore, to my 
knowledge, this is the first study to investigate empirically the interaction of the precision and 
comparability channels, and provide empirical evidence consistent with theory. Finally, I show 
that the proxies I use for precision and comparability are robust and can, therefore, be used in 
future research addressing standard-setting questions.  
These findings should be of interest to standard setters as they show, consistent with 
theory, that new standards can not only increase comparability, but also change the precision 
with which accounting reports reflect economic events. In addition, the fact that both these 
constructs have liquidity effects provides insights potentially relevant to standard setters 
concerned with capital market effects. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section II discusses the institutional 
background, related research, and hypothesis development. Section III develops the research 
design and describes the empirical measures used for theoretical constructs. Section IV describes 
the sample, Section V reports the results, and Section VI concludes the study. 
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CHAPTER 2. INSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND, RELATED RESEARCH, AND 
HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
Institutional background: Revenue standard (ASC 606) 
The FASB issued ASC 606, Revenue from contracts with customers, in May 2014. The 
new revenue standard was the result of a 13-year joint project between the FASB and the 
International Accounting Standards Board. One objective of the project was to create a revenue 
standard that would improve the comparability of revenue between firms that apply International 
Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) and US Generally Accepted Accounting Principles 
(GAAP). The new standard likely also improved comparability among firms that apply US 
GAAP. The FASB’s former revenue standard, ASC 605, Revenue recognition, was used in 
conjunction with numerous pieces of authoritative industry- and transaction-specific guidance 
that often resulted in different accounting for economically similar transactions, reducing 
comparability (Financial Accounting Standards Board 2014). 
To improve comparability, the FASB’s new revenue standard standardizes how firms 
recognize revenue transactions by requiring all firms to follow a five-step recognition process, 
regardless of the industry or the transaction type, where comparability is “the qualitative 
characteristic that enables users to identify and understand similarities in, and difference 
among, items” (Financial Accounting Standards Board 2010). The new revenue standard also 
requires improved disclosures to help users understand the nature, amount, timing, and 
uncertainty of revenues and cash flow. These include quantitative and qualitative disclosures 
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about contracts with customers, significant judgments and changes in judgments, and the cost of 
assets recognized to obtain or fulfill a contract.  
Related research and hypothesis development 
My study relates to accounting literature on the liquidity effect of the adoption of 
accounting standards. Whereas numerous studies investigate the liquidity effect of the adoption 
of IFRS, few investigate the liquidity effect of the change in accounting standards or the 
implementation of a single standard.3 One example of the latter is Mohd (2005), which finds that 
implementing SFAS 86, Accounting for costs of computer software to be sold, leased, or 
otherwise marketed,  decreases information asymmetry for software firms relative to that of other 
high-tech firms.  
Fiechter, Landsman, Peasnell, and Renders (2019), which examines the economic 
consequences of the implementation of multiple industry-specific standards, finds that the 
implementation of industry-specific standards is associated with an increase in stock liquidity 
and greater capital flows to firms affected by the implementation of the standard. A 
contemporaneous study by Chung and Chuwonganant (2019) examines whether the 
implementation of the new revenue standard changed the effect that earnings announcements 
have on market quality and trading activities.4 My study is one of the first to investigate the 
economic consequences of the implementation of the new revenue standard and the first, to my 
                                                 
3 See De George, Li, and Shivakumar (2016) for a review of IFRS adoption studies. 
4 A key difference between that study and mine is that Chung and Chuwonganant (2019) addresses the question of 
whether the change in market quality and trading activities around earnings announcements changes after the 
implementation, whereas I address the question of whether the level of liquidity changes after the implementation. 
Furthermore, Chung and Chuwonganant (2019) examines the effect only at earnings announcements. Finally, in 
addition to addressing the question of whether liquidity increases after the implementation of the standard, I also 
examine the various theoretically motivated channels through which the standard affects liquidity. 
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knowledge, to investigate the channels through which the implementation of a standard affects 
liquidity. 
Two analytical studies, Barth et al. (1999) and Gao et al. (2019), model the capital market 
effects of the adoption of accounting standards. Even though the model used in these studies 
relates to the adoption of a set of standards, for example, US GAAP and IFRS, Gao et al. (2019) 
notes that the model can be applied to the implementation of specific accounting standards 
(methods). The model shows that an increase (decrease) in either precision or comparability 
could lead to an increase (decrease) in price informativeness, and therefore liquidity. The net 
effect of the implementation of accounting standards on liquidity is, therefore, a function of the 
change in both precision and comparability.  
The model shows that an increase (decrease) in precision improves (impairs) price 
informativeness and mitigates (increases) information asymmetry, which in turn leads to an 
increase (decrease) in liquidity. Precision is the accounting report’s ability to reflect the firm’s 
economic events or terminal cash flow.5 In the context of my study, the accounting report is a 
firm’s revenue and precision is the ability of revenue to reflect economic events during the 
period. It is ex-ante unclear whether precision will increase or decrease. On the one hand, the 
new five-step recognition process and the increase in disclosure requirements associated with the 
implementation of the new revenue standard could increase precision. On the other hand, prior 
revenue guidance might have reflected economic events more precisely than the new five-step 
recognition process, and the attempted increase in comparability might come at the cost of 
precision. Whether the new revenue standard increases or decreases precision is, therefore, an 
                                                 
5 I assume that economic events will ultimately lead to terminal cash flow and use the term economic events 
throughout the study. 
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empirical question, and I have no directional prediction regarding the precision effect of the 
implementation of the standard. 
The model also shows that harmonization could decrease the average information 
processing cost per firm to the investor, which would lead to an increase in liquidity.6 The 
authors model an equilibrium in which each investor decides to learn, at a cost, about the 
accounting standards applied by a firm. An investor’s decision to invest in a specific firm is 
subject to an information processing cost constraint, where information processing cost is 
defined as the cost to learn how each individual firm or industry recognizes revenue. 
Under former revenue guidance, an investor would need to incur an information 
processing cost to learn how each individual firm or industry recognizes revenue to be able to 
compare, i.e., identify similarities in, and differences among, firms’ recognized revenue amounts. 
If the new revenue standard increases comparability, an investor would be able to apply 
knowledge of the new revenue standard to larger groups of firms or industries without incurring 
additional information processing cost. Because the investor does not need to incur additional 
information cost to compare more firms’ recognized revenue amount, the average information 
processing cost per firm for the investor will decrease. An increase in comparability would there 
lead to a decrease in the average information processing cost per firm for the investor. 
The model shows that information processing cost is negatively associated with the 
number of informed investors, and because an increase in comparability lowers information 
processing cost, the number of informed investors will increase if comparability increases.7 In 
                                                 
6 Gao et al. (2019) refers to the adoption of common standards, whereas Barth et al (1999) refers to harmonization. 
Furthermore, Gao et. (2019) refers to the decrease in information processing cost effect as the network effect, 
whereas Barth et al (1999) refers to it as the expertise acquisition effect. 
7 An informed investor is an investor who chooses to learn about the revenue recognition of a firm. 
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other words, an increase in comparability will lead to an increase in the number of informed 
investors and I, therefore, use the number of informed investors as a proxy for comparability.8,9 
As the number of informed investors increases, stock price becomes more informative, and 
greater stock price informativeness leads to higher liquidity. Given that one objective of the new 
revenue standard was to increase comparability, I predict that the new revenue standard will 
increase comparability.  
Therefore, because the change in precision is ambiguous, the net effect of the 
implementation of the new revenue standard on liquidity is also ambiguous. The objectives of 
this study are to determine what the net liquidity effect of the implementation of the standard is 
and through which channels the implementation of the standard affects liquidity. 
                                                 
8
 One caveat is that the informed investor will consider the change in precision because of the implementation of the 
new revenue standard when deciding whether to learn about the accounting standards applied by the firm. This is 
because an increase (decrease) in precision will decrease (increase) the profit for the informed investor and therefore 
decrease (increase) the number of informed investors in equilibrium. To address this matter I include a control for 
precision’s effect on the number of informed investors in additional analyses. 
9 I also develop and use an alternative measure for comparability using the economic intuition as discussed in De 
Franco et al. (2011). 
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CHAPTER 3. RESEARCH DESIGN 
Liquidity analysis 
I use a staggered difference-in-differences design to examine the liquidity effect of the 
implementation of the new revenue standard. The standard is effective for fiscal year-ends 
beginning after December 15, 2017, including interim periods therein. The March 2018 quarterly 
reports of December fiscal year-end firms are the first reports that contain the effects of the 
standard.10 January to November fiscal year-end firms implemented the standard for the first 
time in their April 2018 to February 2019 quarterly reports. Therefore, firms implement the 
standard at different dates depending on their fiscal year-ends, which provides the basis for 
exogenous variation in the implementation date.11 
For example, firms with a December fiscal year-end will implement the standard for the 
first time in the March 2018 quarterly report. Firms with a March (June and September) fiscal 
year-end will release a March 2018 annual (quarterly) report, but the report will not yet include 
the effects of the new revenue standard.12 The non-December fiscal year-end firms, therefore, 
serve as a control group. Similarly, the June 2018 quarterly reports of December and March 
fiscal year-end firms will include the effects of the new revenue standard, whereas the June 
                                                 
10 Although firms could early adopt the new revenue standard, less than 1% of firms elected to do so (Peters 2018). 
11 I delete 27 firms that change their reporting periods during the sample period.  
12 One possible concern is that part of the control group includes both annual and quarterly reports. Another concern 




annual (quarterly) report of June (September) fiscal year-end firms will not. The staggered 
implementation allows me to compare the capital market effects of the new revenue standard, 
using the June and September fiscal year-end firms as a control group. One advantage of using a 
staggered difference-in-differences design is that any unobserved factor that might explain the 
outcome needs to coincide with each of the different implementation dates of the new revenue 
standard (Kraft et al. 2018). 
I estimate Equation (1): 
𝐿𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑦_𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽1𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡 × 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡 + 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝜇𝑖 + 𝛾𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡,  (1) 
where the i and t subscript refer to firm and month-year, and 𝜇𝑖 and 𝛾𝑡 are firm and 
month-year fixed effects.13 I include firm fixed effects to control for time-invariant aspects of the 
firm and year-month fixed effects to control for common macroeconomic events. 
Liquidity_variable is one of three measures. The first is the natural log of the quarterly median of 
the daily Amihud (2002) measure of illiquidity, calculated using the unsigned stock return 
divided by USD trading volume (Amihud).14 The second is the natural log of the quarterly 
median of daily quoted spreads, calculated using the daily closing bid and ask prices divided by 
the midpoint (Bid_ask) (Daske, Hail, Leuz, & Verdi 2008; Christensen et al. 2013; Glaeser 
2018). 
Because Amihud and Bid_ask are illiquidity measures, I take the negative of Amihud and 
Bid_ask to ease the interpretation of the results. Both of these measures are calculated using the 
daily data in the quarter following the implementation of the new revenue standard. For example, 
                                                 
13 I include month-year fixed effects because quarterly reports are released every month, depending on the fiscal 
year-end of the firm. Treat and Post are omitted in the equation because Treat and Post are subsumed by the firm 
and month-year fixed effects. 
14 Similar to Christensen et al. (2013), I omit zero-return days from the computation of the quarterly median. 
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if a firm has a December fiscal year-end, the March 2018 quarterly report is the first report that 
includes the effects of the new revenue standard and the Liquidity_variable is calculated using 
daily data in the quarter following March 2018, i.e., the quarter ending June 2018. I use factor 
analysis to identify a common factor, Liquidity, that explains common variation between Amihud 
and Bid_ask (Daske et al. 2008; Christensen et al. 2013). Treat×Post, the variable of interest, 
equals one if the quarterly or annual report has been prepared using the new revenue standard, 
zero otherwise. 
Controls includes a variety of firm-level variables identified by prior research as being 
associated with liquidity: the natural log of the standard deviation of returns (SD_returnst–4), the 
natural log of the market value of equity (Sizet–4), and the natural log of the quarterly median of 
daily turnover, calculated as volume of shares traded divided by number of shares outstanding 
(Turnovert–4). I lag all variables by one year (Christensen et al. 2013). I also include controls that 
are standard in the disclosure literature (Guay et al. 2016; Glaeser 2018): income before 
extraordinary items scaled by assets (ROA), market value of equity to book value of equity (MB), 
book value of total debt to book value of total assets (Leverage), buy and hold returns over the 
quarter (Q_return), an indicator equal to one if the firm is a loss firm (Loss), special items scaled 
by total assets (SI), and number of analysts providing revenue forecasts (Analyst).15 
The coefficient on the variable of interest, Treat×Post, reflects the liquidity effect of the 
implementation of the new revenue standard. I interpret a positive (negative) coefficient as the 
implementation of the new revenue standard increasing (decreasing) the liquidity of the average 
firm. 
                                                 
15 Similar to Amihud and Bid_ask, SD_returns, Turnover, and Q_return are calculated in the three months following 
the fiscal quarter. 
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Channels through which the implementation of the standard can affect liquidity 
In this section, I explore the channels through which the implementation of the new 
revenue standard could affect liquidity and I estimate the following equations to do so:  
𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡 = 𝜆1𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡 × 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡 + 𝜇𝑖 + 𝛾𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 (2) 
𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡 = 𝜃1𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡 × 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡 + 𝜇𝑖 + 𝛾𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡, (3) 
where Precision (Informed) is a proxy for precision (the number of informed investors) 
and is defined below. As explained in the previous section, the correlation between the 
implementation of the standard, Treat×Post, and precision, Precision, is ambiguous and a 
positive (negative) 𝜆1 coefficient is evidence of an increase (decrease) in precision. I predict a 
positive correlation between the implementation of common accounting standards, Treat×Post, 
and the number of informed investors, Informed, and I, therefore, predict a positive 𝜃1 
coefficient.  
I require proxies for precision and informed investors to estimate Equations (2) and (3). 
Prior analytical work models precision as the accounting report’s ability to reflect the firm’s 
fundamentals. More specifically, precision is modeled as the reciprocal of the standard deviation 
of the measurement error that is obtained when the economic events are mapped to the 
accounting report ( Barth et al. 1999; Gao et al. 2019). Thus, precision is the reciprocal of 𝜎𝜀𝑖, 
where 𝜀𝑖 is the difference between 𝑟𝑖 and 𝛼𝑖 × 𝑣𝑖, from 𝑟𝑖 = 𝛼𝑖 × 𝑣𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖, 𝑟𝑖 is the accounting 
report, 𝛼𝑖 is the mapping of 𝑣𝑖 to 𝑟𝑖, and 𝑣𝑖 is the economic events during the period. In my 
setting, the accounting report is revenue. The coefficient on 𝑣𝑖, 𝛼𝑖, can be interpreted as the 
reciprocal of the revenue multiple in a valuation process. Precision is inherently difficult to 
measure because the economic events are unobservable to the researcher. Nevertheless, I 
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calculate two proxies for precision and use factor analysis to identify a common factor that 
explains common variation between these proxies. 
I use an empirical implementation of prior analytical and empirical work. Prior literature 
defines the accounting system as a mapping of economic events to the accounting report (De 
Franco et al. 2011; Yip and Young 2012) and uses returns as a proxy for economic events. 
Because the new revenue standard will affect Revenue, I use Revenue as a proxy for the 
accounting report. I, therefore, estimate the following equation: 
𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽1𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝜇𝑖 + 𝛾𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡, (4) 
where Revenue is revenue for the quarter and Returns is the quarterly return for the same 
quarter.16 I estimate Equation (4) for the pre- and post-implementation periods separately to 
allow the 𝛽1 coefficient to differ in the two periods because the accounting standard changed 
from the pre- to post-implementation period. 𝛽1 reflects the mapping of economic events to the 
accounting report during the period and the residual from Equation (4), 𝜀𝑖𝑡, reflects the 
measurement error in the mapping of economic events to the accounting report during the period. 
I use the residual from Equation (4) to calculate the standard deviation of the residual in the pre- 
and post-implementation periods. The natural log of the reciprocal of the standard deviation is 
the first proxy for precision, i.e., Precision_residualiω = ln (
1
𝜎𝜀𝑖𝜔
), where 𝜔 represents either the 
pre- or post-implementation period.17  
As discussed in the previous section, the new revenue standard also increases the amount 
of disclosure required. Equation (4) will not reflect the increase in disclosure and a possible 
                                                 
16 I delete 207 observations where the absolute quarterly return is greater than 100%. 
17 Note that the standard deviation of the residual is divided by the mean of Revenue, i.e., I use the coefficient of 
variation. Not doing so would mechanically assign higher precision to firms with lower revenue. 
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increase in disclosure quality. If disclosure quality increases, the information risk will decrease, 
and a decrease in information risk will decrease the required rate of return. I use the standard 
deviation of daily returns over the quarter, SD_returns, as a proxy for the required rate of return 
and calculate the second proxy for precision as the natural log of the reciprocal of the standard 
deviation of daily returns over the quarter, i.e., Precision_returnsit = ln (
1
𝑆𝐷_𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡
). Finally, I 
use factor analysis to identify a common factor that explains common variation between the two 
precision proxies, Precision.  
I use the natural log of the number of institutional investors, Informed, as a proxy for the 
number of informed investors. As discussed in the previous section, an increase in comparability 
will decrease the average information processing cost, which will increase the number of 
informed investors. The increase in the number of informed investors will, in turn, lead to an 
increase in liquidity because as the number of informed investors increases, the stock price 
becomes more informative and the greater stock price informativeness leads to higher liquidity. 
Therefore, because an increase in comparability will lead to an increase in the number of 
informed investors, the number of informed investors is a proxy for comparability. I could 
investigate comparability using proxies for information processing cost, the number of informed 
investors, or stock price informativeness or by constructing a comparability measure. I choose to 
use a proxy for the number of informed investors for three reasons. First, using a proxy for the 
number of informed investors does not involve any calculations or estimations that might be 
subject to measurement error. Second, the analytical model provides the opportunity to test the 
construct validity of my proxy for the number of informed investors (see section V). Third, 
comparability is an unobservable characteristic that is difficult to measure, and I, therefore,   
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choose to examine a consequence of an increase in comparability, i.e., an increase in the number 
of informed investors. Nevertheless, I develop and use an alternative measure for comparability 
in additional analyses.18
                                                 
18 I do not calculate comparability using the De Franco et al. (2011) the  measure as this measure requires 16 
quarters of data per firm. 
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CHAPTER 4. SAMPLE AND DATA 
I begin by obtaining all firm observations from Compustat with fiscal quarters ending 
between March 1, 2017 and February 28, 2019 and the sample, therefore, includes one year of 
data before and after the implementation for December fiscal year-end firms. I end the sample 
period on February 28, 2019 to exclude the possible effects of the implementation of the new 
leasing standard (ASC 842) that is effective for annual periods, including interim periods therein, 
beginning after December 15, 2018, which is one year after the effective date of the new revenue 
standard. I obtain financial statement data from Compustat, market data from CRSP, and 
institutional holdings data from Thompson Reuters. I delete all observations where data are 
missing for the estimation of Equation (1) and require firms to have quarterly sales greater or 
equal to zero.19 I delete all firms that changed their fiscal year-end during the sample period and 
require at least 20 days of daily CRSP data per quarter to calculate Amihud and Bid_ask. The 
final sample consists of 24,675 firm-quarter observations and 3,475 firms with an average of 7.1 
quarters per firm over the two year sample period. 
Table 1 reports the descriptive statistics, and Table 2 reports the Pearson correlation 
coefficients between variables used in Equation (1).20 Because Table 1 shows that both liquidity 
measures are right-skewed, I use the natural log of the measures when estimating all equations 
                                                 
19 I assign an analyst following of zero to firms to firms missing analyst data. Inferences from estimating Equation 
(1) remain unchanged if I delete observations with missing analyst data. I include only common stock (CRSP shrcd 
10 or 11) observations. 
20 Using the full sample. I winsorize all continuous variables at the 1st and 99th percentiles to mitigate the effect of 
outliers on my inferences.  
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(Christensen et al. 2013; Daske et al. 2013). Less than half the sample represents observations 
from the pre-implementation period (mean of Treat×Post is 0.446), which is expected because of 
the staggered difference-in-differences research design. The univariate correlations between 
Treat×Post and both Amihud and Bid_ask are positive and significant at the one percent level. 
The association between the implementation of the new revenue standard and the liquidity 
measures at a univariate level is suggestive of the implementation causing an increase in 
liquidity. As expected, the correlation between the liquidity measures, Amihud and Bid_ask, is 
positive and significant at the one percent level. 
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CHAPTER 5. RESULTS 
Liquidity effect 
Table 3 provides the results from estimating Equation (1). The first and second trio of 
columns provide results without and with controls included in the estimating equation. All 
standard errors are clustered by firm.21 Amihud is positively associated with Treat×Post at the 
one percent level in both estimations, and the coefficients are 0.09 and 0.10 without and with 
controls. The inferences from using Bid_ask as the dependent variable are similar, where the 
associations between Bid_ask and Treat×Post are positive and significant at the one percent 
level, and the coefficients are 0.05, regardless of whether controls are included. The associations 
between Liquidity and Treat×Post are positive and significant at the one percent level, and the 
coefficients are 0.03, regardless of whether controls are included.22 Focusing on the Liquidity 
coefficient estimated from Equation (1) with controls, Treat×Post is associated with a 3% 
increase in liquidity and the 95% confidence intervals of the coefficient are 0.02 and 0.05. 
Providing evidence that the increase in liquidity is caused by the implementation of the new 
revenue standard is the objective of the section below. 
                                                 
21 Following Petersen (2009), I include month-year fixed effects but do not cluster standard errors by month-year 
because the number of clusters (month-years) is only eight per firm. However, I also estimate a version of Equation 
(1) clustering by firm and year-month; untabulated findings result in the same inferences as those based on findings 
in Table 3. 
22 I also estimate Equation (1) excluding firm fixed effects. Untabulated findings reveal the coefficient on Liquidity 
is 0.03 and significant at the 5% level. Furthermore, the adjusted R-squared of the equation is 0.89, indicating that 
firm fixed effects are not solely responsible for the model explanatory power. 
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Liquidity effect: Parallel trends assumption, reversal of the difference test, and placebo 
tests 
One of the main assumptions of the difference-in-differences design is the parallel trends 
assumption. This assumption is inherently untestable because it assumes that the trends of the 
treated and control firms would have continued in the absence of the treatment. However, one 
can provide support for the parallel trends assumption by providing evidence that there was no 
trend before the treatment or that there were indistinguishable differences between the treatment 
and control group’s dependent variable before the treatment. I follow Kraft et al. (2018) and 
Glaeser (2018) and estimate the following equation: 
𝐿𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽1𝐵𝑒𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑒_𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2 𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟_𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑡 + 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝜇𝑖 + 𝛾𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡, (5) 
where Before_all is an indicator variable that equals one for all periods before the 
implementation of the new revenue standard, and After_all is an indicator variable that equals 
one for all periods after the implementation. The coefficients of Equation (5) have to be 
interpreted with the understanding that all firms are eventually treated during the sample period, 
and consequently, one period has to be used as the reference group. I use the period just before 
the implementation as the reference group. For example, if a firm has a December (June) fiscal 
year-end, then the December (June) reporting period is used as the reference group because the 
first treated report is the March (September) quarterly report. An insignificant 𝛽1 coefficient is 
evidence of the absence of a trend before the implementation of the standard.  
I also estimate an extended version of Equation (5), disaggregating the Before_all 
(After_all) variables into specific periods before (after) the implementation: 
𝐿𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽1𝐵𝑒𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑡−3 + 𝛽2𝐵𝑒𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑡−2 + 𝛽3𝐵𝑒𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽4𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑡+1 +
𝛽5𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑡+2 + 𝛽6𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑡+3 + 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝜇𝑖 + 𝛾𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡,  (6) 
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where Beforeit–n (Afterit+n) is the n periods before (after) the reference group used in 
Equation (4).23 Similar to the interpretation of Equation (5), insignificant 𝛽1, 𝛽2, and 𝛽3 
coefficients are evidence of no trend before the implementation. Significant 𝛽4, 𝛽5, and 𝛽6 
coefficients are evidence that Liquidity in the post-implementation period is significantly 
different from that in the pre-implementation period. 
Table 4 and Figure 1 provide support for the parallel trends assumption by providing 
evidence that there was no trend before the implementation. The results from estimating 
Equations (5) and (6) indicate that there were no significant differences in liquidity in the periods 
before the implementation, and no trend was, therefore, present before the implementation. The 
coefficient on Before_all, 0.00, is insignificant, which indicates that the liquidity in the period 
before the implementation is not significantly different from liquidity in all periods before the 
implementation combined. Furthermore, when I disaggregate Before_all into more granular 
periods in Equation (6), the Beforet-3, Beforeit-2, and Beforeit-1 coefficients, 0.00, 0.00, and –0.01, 
and are all insignificant. The results imply that there was no significant liquidity difference in 
any of the periods before the implementation, and no trend was, therefore, present, providing 
evidence in support of the parallel trends assumption. Contrary to the Before_all coefficient, the 
After_all coefficient, 0.03, is significant at the one percent level. Disaggregating the After_all 
into more granular periods, Aftert+1, Afterit+2, and Afterit+3, reveals that all three coefficients are 
positive and significant. Taken together, Table 4 shows that there was no trend in the pre-
implementation period and that Liquidity in the post-implementation period differs significantly 
from that of the pre-implementation period. 
                                                 
23 If an observation is more than three periods before (after) the period in the reference group it is included with the 
observations in third period before (after) the reference group. 
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Visually it seems as though there is a positive trend after the implementation of the 
standard. This could happen because as more firms implement the standard, firms that have 
already implemented the standard experience a positive spillover effect (Gao et al. 2019). To test 
whether this the case, I estimate a version of Equation (5) in which I interact After_all with 
Trend, where Trend is the number of quarters relative to the reference period. Untabulated results 
show that there is a positive trend (coefficient = 0.01), but that the coefficient is insignificant. 
Therefore, even though a spill-over effect exists, the majority of the liquidity effect occurs at 
initial implementation. 
The setting allows me to perform a reversal of differences test. As explained above, the 
December fiscal year-end firms will be the first firms to implement the new revenue standard in 
their March 2018 quarterly reports. If the implementation caused a liquidity difference between 
the December and non-December fiscal year-end firms, one would expect the difference to 
decrease as the non-December fiscal year-end firms implement the standard. To test whether this 
is the case, I estimate the following equation: 
𝐿𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽1𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑠𝑡_𝑎𝑑𝑜𝑝𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑠 × 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑐ℎ2017𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽2𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑠𝑡_𝑎𝑑𝑜𝑝𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑠 × 𝐽𝑢𝑛𝑒2017𝑖𝑡 +
 𝛽3𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑠𝑡_𝑎𝑑𝑜𝑝𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑠 × 𝑆𝑒𝑝𝑡𝑒𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟2017𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽4𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑠𝑡_𝑎𝑑𝑜𝑝𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑠 × 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑐ℎ2018𝑖𝑡 +
 𝛽5𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑠𝑡_𝑎𝑑𝑜𝑝𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑠 × 𝐽𝑢𝑛𝑒2018𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑠𝑡_𝑎𝑑𝑜𝑝𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑠 × 𝑆𝑒𝑝𝑡𝑒𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟2018𝑖𝑡 +
 𝛽7𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑠𝑡_𝑎𝑑𝑜𝑝𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑠 × 𝐷𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟2018𝑖𝑡 + 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝜇𝑖 + 𝛾𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡, (7) 
where First_adopters are firms with a December fiscal year-end and were, therefore, the 
first to implement the standard.24 March2017 to December2018 are indicator variables that equal 
one if the fiscal quarter ends in that month, and zero otherwise. Insignificant 𝛽1, 𝛽2, and 𝛽3 
                                                 
24 First_adopters and March2017 to December2018 are omitted in the equation because First_adopters is collinear 
with firm and March2017 to December2018 is collinear with month-year. 
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coefficients are evidence that there is no liquidity difference between the December and non-
December fiscal year-end firms in each of the periods leading up to the implementation of the 
new revenue standard.25  
If the implementation caused a liquidity difference between the December and non-
December fiscal year-end firms, one would expect the difference to exist for the first period after 
the implementation, i.e., 𝛽4 > 0, and to decrease and become insignificant for subsequent 
periods, i.e., 𝛽4 > 𝛽5 > 𝛽6 > 𝛽7. Theoretically, 𝛽7 should not be significantly different from zero 
because all firms are treated at this stage, and there should be no liquidity difference between the 
December and non-December fiscal year-end firms.26 An insignificant 𝛽7 is evidence that the 
results from estimating Equation (1) are not because of an underlying trend, but because of the 
implementation of the standard. Therefore, any confounding factor that might explain the results 
from estimating Equation (1) would have to explain the reversal from estimating Equation (7).  
Table 5, which presents findings from estimating Equation (7), and Figure 2 provide 
evidence on the differences between the First_adopters and the rest of the sample. The 
coefficients on First_adopters×March2017, First_adopters×June2017, and 
First_adopters×September2017 are –0.005, –0.003, and –0.012, and are all insignificant, which 
implies that there was no liquidity difference between the First_adopters and the rest of the 
                                                 
25 I use only firms with quarterly or annual reports that coincide with the December fiscal year-end firms’ quarterly 
or annual reports. In other words, Equation (7) includes only March, June, September, and December fiscal year-end 
firms. I exclude the other fiscal year-end firms because I compare Liquidity at December fiscal year-end firms’ 
reporting dates and only March, June, and September fiscal year-end firms have calculated Liquidity periods that 
coincide with December fiscal year-end firms’ reporting dates. The firms included in Equation (7) represent more 
than 90% of the sample. Also, in additional analyses I assess the sensitivity of my inferences based on the Table 3 
findings by using only March, June, September and December fiscal year-end firms. 
26 Similar to Equations (4) and (5), the reference (omitted) period is the period before the implementation. In this 
case it is quarterly and annual reports for the quarter ending December 2017. 
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sample in the pre-implementation period.27 The coefficient on First_adopters×March2018, 
0.031, is significant at the one percent level, which implies that a difference between the 
First_adopters and the rest of the sample originated when the First_adopters were treated, i.e., 
when they implemented the new revenue standard.  
Table 5 and Figure 2 also show that the difference between the First_adopters and the 
rest of the sample decreases monotonically and becomes less significant as more firms 
implement the standard. More specifically, the difference is significant at the one percent level in 
the first period after the First_adopters implemented the standard (coefficient = 0.031), 
significant at the five percent level in the second period after the implementation (coefficient = 
0.029), and insignificant in the third period after the implementation (coefficient = 0.026). In the 
fourth period after the implementation, once all firms have implemented the standard, the 
difference between the First_adopters and the rest of the sample is insignificant (coefficient = 
0.011). Therefore, if a factor other than the implementation of the new revenue standard caused 
the decrease in liquidity, that factor should also systematically decrease the liquidity difference 
between December and non-December fiscal year-end firms as non-December fiscal year-end 
firms implement the standard.  
I also perform placebo tests by leading the implementation of the new revenue standard 
by one and two year(s). If there is something inherently different about December fiscal year-end 
firms that causes liquidity to be different at certain times of the year, this difference should be 
present in the years before the implementation of the standard.28 Therefore, I estimate modified 
                                                 
27 By construction the coefficient on First_adopters×December2017 is zero as it is the reference group. 
28 An alternative approach is to assign the implementation to the control groups. However, this cannot be done in 
this setting because all firms eventually implement the standard. The next best approach is randomizing the 
implementation date and this is the approach I follow by leading the implementation date.  
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versions of Equation (1) where I lead the implementation by one or two years.29 Untabulated 
findings reveal that leading the implementation by one (two) year(s) results in an insignificant 
coefficient of –0.01 (–0.00) on Treat×Post. These results provide evidence that the observed 
effect is not attributable to systematic differences between December and non-December fiscal 
year-end firms that arise every year. 
Precision and comparability effects 
Table 6 reports the results from estimating Equation (2), i.e., the precision effect of the 
implementation of the new revenue standard. Column 1 reveals that Precision increases by 11% 
following the implementation of the standard.30 Columns 2 and 3 show the results when 
estimating Equation (2) using each of the variables that comprise of the Precision factor, i.e., 
Precision_residual and Precision_returns. As expected, both these variables are positively 
related with Treat×Post. Columns 4 to 6 reveal the results when I calculate Precision by 
estimating alternative versions of Equation (4). Column 4 (5) shows the results when I use the 
share price of the firm (cash flow from operations) as a proxy for economic events instead of 
Returns. The Treat×Post coefficient using the share price of the firm (cash flow from operations) 
as a proxy for economic events is 0.10 (0.11) and is significant at the one percent level. I also 
estimate Equation (4) per industry, therefore allowing the slope coefficient to differ between 
industries when calculating Precision. The Treat×Post coefficient in column 6 is 0.10 and is 
significant at the one percent level, suggesting that the alternative estimation procedures do not 
alter the inferences based on the findings in columns 1 to 3. 
                                                 
29 I also lead the sample period by one (two) years in the placebo tests. In other words, the sample period for leading 
the implementation date by one (two) year(s) is March 1, 2016 to February 28, 2018 (March 1, 2015 to February 28, 
2017).  
30 The percentage increase is calculated as e0.1-1 = 0.11. 
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Investors might not incorporate the effect of the new revenue standard immediately 
because they do not initially understand how the economic events map into the changed 
accounting report. Column 7 indicates that the inferences remain unchanged when I exclude the 
first period after the implementation of the standard, but, as expected, the 𝜆1 coefficient, i.e., the 
increase in precision, increases from 0.10 to 0.20. In column 8 I estimate a modified version of 
Equation (2) where I lead the implementation by one year. The findings in column 8 reveal that 
leading the implementation by one year results in an insignificant coefficient of 0.01 on 
Treat×Post. Overall, the evidence in Table 6 suggests that the implementation of the new 
recognition standard increases precision. 
Table 7 provides evidence on the increase in the number of informed investors, i.e., the 
comparability effect of the implementation of the standard. Column 1 reveals that the 
implementation of the new revenue standard is associated with a 3% increase in the number of 
informed investors. I again exclude the first period after the implementation of the standard and, 
as expected, find that the coefficient on Treat×Post increases from 0.03 to 0.04. I also lead the 
implementation by one year (column 3) and show that there was no comparability effect in the 
prior year. 
Theory predicts that higher (lower) precision will attract fewer (more) informed investors 
(Gao et al. 2019). Furthermore, the increase in informed investors could increase liquidity, and 
the higher liquidity could subsequently attract more informed investors in subsequent periods. 
Therefore, I estimate Equation (3) but control for Precision and the level of Liquidity in the 
previous period. The coefficient of interest in column 4, i.e., the coefficient on Treat×Post, is 
0.02 and is significant at the one percent level. As predicted by theory, the coefficient on 
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Precision is negative, but it is insignificant. I explore the various paths in further detail in the 
path analysis section below. 
I study the construct validity of Informed by investigating whether the increase in 
Informed is a function of the relative size of the firm. Gao et al. (2019) shows that the increase in 
the number of informed investors in firm i will be a function of the total size of all other firms 
using the accounting standard relative to the size of firm i, where size refers to the number of 
liquidity traders in the firm. Therefore, according to the model, a firm that has relatively fewer 
liquidity traders should experience a larger increase in the number of informed traders. Because 
the number of liquidity traders in a firm is unobservable, I use the number of shareholders in a 
firm, Num_sh, as a proxy for the number of liquidity traders and therefore assume a positive 
association between Num_sh and the number of liquidity traders. I calculate the relative size of 





.31,32 Therefore, I estimate a version of Equation (3) where I interact Treat×Post with 
Relative_size. As expected, the coefficient on the interaction is positive and significant at the one 
percent level which adds to the construct validity of using Informed as a proxy for the number of 
informed investors. 
Cross-sectional analyses 
If Precision and Informed are the channels through which the implementation of the new 
revenue standard affects liquidity, then the coefficient on Treat×Post should decrease or become 
                                                 
31 I use the number of shareholders in the period before the implementation of the standard. 
32 Relative_size is standardized to have mean zero and a standardized deviation of one to ease interpretation. 
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insignificant once I control for the channels, i.e., Precision and Informed. Therefore, I estimate 
the following equation: 
𝐿𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽1𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡 × 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡 +
𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝜇𝑖 + 𝛾𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡.  (8) 
Column 1 in Table 8 reports the results from estimation of Equation (8). The insignificant 
Treat×Post coefficient provides evidence that Precision and Informed are the channels through 
which the implementation of the standard affects liquidity. Another important observation is that 
the proxies used for precision and the number of informed investors are positively associated 
with liquidity, as predicted by theory. The Precision and Informed coefficients, 0.08 and 0.35, 
are positive and significant at the one percent level. The fact that the associations are as predicted 
by theory bolsters the construct validity of the proxies used for precision and the number of 
informed investors. 
Column 2 (3) of Table 8 shows the results from the estimation of a version of Equation 
(1) that includes firms for which Precision decreases (increases). The difference in Precision is 
the difference between the mean Precision before and after the implementation of the revenue 
standard, and I demean Precision by month-year before calculating the difference to control for 
month-year fixed effects. Furthermore, I control for Informed because I am interested in the 
liquidity effect of an increase in Precision. As expected, the firms that experience an increase in 
Precision also experience an increase in liquidity, whereas the firms that experience a decrease 
in Precision experience no increase in liquidity. I follow a similar process and estimate a version 
of Equation (1) for those firms that experience a decrease and increase in Informed. Column 4 
shows firms that experience a decrease in Informed do not experience an increase in liquidity, 
whereas the firms that experience an increase Informed do experience an increase in liquidity. 
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I also estimate Equation (1) for those firms that experience a decrease in both Precision 
and Informed. As expected, column 6 shows that these firms do not experience an increase in 
liquidity. Finally, I estimate Equation (1) for those firms that experience an increase in both 
Precision and Informed. Column 7 reveals that this subset of firms experiences the greatest 
increase in liquidity, i.e., the coefficient is 0.074, whereas the coefficient for those firms that 
experience an increase in Precision (Informed) is 0.031 (0.047). Therefore, the results seem to 
suggest that those firms that experience an increase in both Precision and Informed experience 
the greatest liquidity increase and that firms that experience an increase in neither Precision nor 
Informed do not experience an increase in liquidity. The results, therefore, suggest that both 
precision and comparability are the channels through which the implementation of the standard 
affects liquidity. 
Path analysis 
Next, I use path analysis to provide additional support for the inferences I draw from the 
cross-sectional analysis. Using path analysis, I disaggregate the correlation between the 
implementation of the new revenue standard and liquidity into the channels identified by theory. 
Doing so provides evidence on the existence and relative importance of the channels between the 
implementation of the standard and liquidity (Bhattacharya et al. 2012; Landsman et al. 2012). 
The two indirect, or mediated, channels are the two channels identified by theory: the precision 
and comparability channels. The direct channel is the correlation that is not explained by the two 
indirect channels. Figure 3 shows the path diagram. The path arrows represent the assumed 
relations among variables and the proxies for the theoretical constructs are indicated in 
parenthesis.  
I implement path analysis using the following system of equations:  
𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡 = 𝜆1𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡 × 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡 + 𝜇𝑖 + 𝛾𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 (2) 
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𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡 = 𝜃1𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡 × 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡 + 𝜇𝑖 + 𝛾𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 (3) 
𝐿𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽1𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡 × 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡 +
𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝜇𝑖 + 𝛾𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡.  (8) 
The total effect of each channel is calculated as the product of the two coefficients 
leading to and from each of the mediating variables, i.e., Precision and Informed. Regarding the 
precision (comparability) channel, the 𝜆1 (𝜃1) coefficient, i.e., the correlation between 
Treat×Post and Precision (Informed), is 0.107 (0.030) and significant at the one percent level, 
indicating that the implementation of the revenue standard is associated with an 11% (3%) 
increase in precision (the number of informed investors). The 𝛽2 (𝛽3) coefficient, i.e., the 
correlation between Precision (Informed) and Liquidity, is 0.084 (0.36) and is significant at the 
one percent level. The total precision (comparability) channel effect that is obtained by 
multiplying the 𝜆1 and 𝛽2 (𝜃1 and 𝛽3) coefficients is 0.009 (0.011).  
The direct effect, i.e., the correlation between Treat×Post and Liquidity is insignificant. 
The direct channel’s insignificant 𝛽1 coefficient, 0.009, adds to the construct validity of the 
proxies used for precision and number of informed investors because the Precision and Informed 
channels account for all of the significant correlation between Treat×Post and Liquidity. 
Focusing only on the significant channels reveals that the precision channel accounts for 45% of 
the increase in liquidity, whereas the comparability channel accounts for 55% of the increase in 
liquidity. More importantly, the inferences are consistent with the inferences based on Table 7 
findings, i.e., both the precision and comparability channel contribute to the increase in liquidity.  
In addition to the path analysis as outlined in Figure 3, I also estimate a version that 
includes paths from Precision to Informed, Informed to Precision, and Liquidity to Informed (see 
figure 4). Inferences from estimating the alternative path analysis remain unchanged. 
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Specifically, the total effect of the two channels, i.e., total indirect effect, accounts for 0.014 of 
the increase and is significant at the one percent level. The direct effect is significant using the 
alternative path analysis, but only at the 10 percent level (coefficient = 0.014). 
Liquidity effect: Additional analyses 
Firms in specific industries might choose the same fiscal year-end as their peers, which 
suggests that the liquidity implementation effect is concentrated in industries where firms cluster 
their fiscal year-ends. To address this concern, I re-estimate Equation (1) using industries whose 
firms’ fiscal year-ends are less clustered. To do so, I calculate the number of firms per industry 
that are expected to have a December fiscal year-end.33 I calculate the expectation by multiplying 
the number of firms in an industry by the percentage of all firms with a December fiscal year-
end, irrespective of industry. I then delete all industries where the actual number of December 
fiscal year-end firms is 2/1 (1/2) times more (less) than the expected number of December fiscal 
year-end firms and re-estimate Equation (1). Untabulated findings reveal the inferences are the 
same as those based on Table 3 findings.34 
I also re-estimate Equation (1) by including fiscal quarter fixed effects, where fiscal 
quarter number refers to the first, second, third, or fourth fiscal quarter. Untabulated findings 
based on the modified equation yields the same inferences as those based on Table 3 findings. I 
also delete fourth fiscal quarters (annual reports) and re-estimate Equation (1). Untabulated 
findings reveal the inferences are the same as those based on Table 3 findings. 
                                                 
33 Unless noted otherwise, industry refers to the Fama-French 48 industry classification. 
34 Choosing to delete all industries where the actual number of December fiscal year-end firms is 3/2 (2/3), 4/3 (3/4), 
5/4 (4/5), or 6/5 (5/6) times more (less) than the expected number of December fiscal year-end firms does not 
change the inferences. 
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I estimate a version of Equation (1) in which I interact Treat×Post with NonDec, where 
NonDec is an indicator variable that equals one if the firm has a non-December fiscal year-end, 
and zero otherwise. Untabulated findings reveal that the coefficient on the interacted variable is 
insignificantly different from zero, indicating that the liquidity effect of the implementation is 
present in December and non-December fiscal year-end firms and that the effect does not differ 
between December and non-December fiscal year-end firms. 
I also use data from Compustat to identify firms that were substantively affected by the 
implementation of the new revenue standard. Compustat defines substantively affected as 
“accounting changes that have a substantive impact on the measurement and presentation of 
financial data, or which require significant new disclosures.” I estimate a version of Equation (1) 
in which I interact Treat×Post with Material, where Material is an indicator variable that equals 
one if the firm was substantively affected by the implementation of the standard. Untabulated 
findings reveal that, as expected, the coefficient on the interacted variable is positive and 
significant at the one percent level. Furthermore, the twenty-fifth (fiftieth) [seventy-fifth] 
percentile of the mean number of firms substantively affected per industry is 45% (54%) [64%], 
alluding to the fact that the majority of industries were substantively affected by the 
implementation of the standard. This reinforces the notion that the implementation of the 
standard affected a wide variety of firms across all industries. In addition, inferences from Table 
3 findings remain unchanged when I eliminate all firms that were substantively affected by the 
implementation of other standards at the same time as when the new revenue standard was 
implemented. 
Furthermore, in accordance with SEC Staff Accounting Bulletin No. 74 (SAB 74), 
Disclosure of the impact that recently issued accounting standards will have on the financial 
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statements of the registrant when adopted in a future period, it is possible that firms could 
disclose certain information before the implementation date of the standard. This is, however, not 
a concern for three reasons. First, the evidence seems to suggest that less than 12% of firms 
disclosed the effect of the new revenue standard on revenue before the implementation of the 
standard (Coleman and Usvyatsky 2019). Second, even if firms disclose the effect of the 
implementation of the standard on revenue, firms will still disclose additional information once 
they implement the standard. Third, the disclosure in accordance with SAB 74 would bias 
against finding any significant association between the implementation of the standard and 
liquidity because the liquidity effects of SAB 74 would occur before the implementation of the 
standard, therefore biasing the coefficient between the implementation of the standard and 
liquidity downwards. 
I also conduct several other analyses to assess the sensitivity of my inferences to various 
sample characteristics. In particular, I delete bank observations, use the quarterly means (instead 
of median) of the daily Amihud (2002) measure and daily quoted spreads, create a Liquidity 
factor that includes the proportion of zero-returns trading days, only include firms that have no 
missing observations during the sample period, only include firms that have reporting periods 
that end on March, June, September, and December, and calculate the liquidity variables using 
daily data between the earnings announcement date and the end of the following fiscal quarter . 
All inferences from re-estimating Equation (1) using the different samples are the same as those 
based on Table 3 findings. 
Alternative measure of comparability 
I develop an alternative measure for comparability using the economic intuition as 
discussed in De Franco et al. (2011). As mentioned earlier, in Equation (4) (𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒𝑖𝑡 =
𝛽1𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝜇𝑖 + 𝛾𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡) Revenue is a proxy for the accounting report, Returns is a proxy 
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for economic events, and the 𝛽1 coefficient reflects the mapping of economic events to the 
accounting report during the period. If the new revenue standard causes firms in different 
industries to account for the same economic events in a similar manner, then the difference in 
mapping between industries should decrease after the implementation of the standard. To 
empirically test whether this is the case, I first estimate Equation (4) per industry in the pre-and 
post-implementation period, respectively. This allows me to obtain a mapping (𝛽1) per industry 
for the pre- and post-implementation period. 
Next, I determine how much a specific industry’s mapping differs from other industries’ 
mappings. I do so by calculating the average absolute difference between industry i’s and 
industry j’s mapping, i.e., 𝐴𝑙𝑡_𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑖𝜔 =  (
1
𝐽
 ×  ∑ |𝛽1𝑖𝜔 − 𝛽1𝑗𝜔|
𝐽
𝑗=1 ), where 𝛽1𝑖𝜔 (𝛽1𝑗𝜔) is the 
coefficient on Returns from estimating Equation (4) for industry i (j) in period 𝜔, J is the number 
of industries excluding industry i, and 𝜔 represents one of two distinct periods, i.e., the pre- or 
post-implementation period. I use the negative of the natural logarithm of Alt_Comp to ease 
interpretation, i.e., the higher Alt_Comp, the higher comparability. 
I estimate the following equation to determine whether the implementation of the new 
revenue standard is associated with an increase in the alternative comparability measure: 
𝐴𝑙𝑡_𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑖𝜔 = 𝛽1𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡 × 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡 + 𝜇𝑝 + 𝛾𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡, (9) 
where the p subscript refers to industry. I use industry fixed effects and cluster standard 
errors by industry because the dependent variable, Alt_Comp, is calculated per industry.  
Untabulated results reveal that comparability increases after the implementation of the 
new revenue standard. Furthermore, the standard deviation of the industry-specific 𝛽1’s decrease 
after the implementation of the standard. This alludes to the comparability effect of the standard, 
i.e., that the difference in mapping between industries decreases. I omit the intercept when 
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estimating Equation (4) to allow 𝛽1 to reflect the total mapping of economic events to the 
accounting report. Two alternative approaches are to estimate Equation (4) with an intercept and 
assume the mapping is the sum of the intercept and 𝛽1 or ignore the intercept. Inferences are 
unchanged when using Alt_Comp that is calculated using the alternative estimation procedures. 
Furthermore, inferences are unchanged when I use cash flow from operations as a proxy for 
economic events instead of Returns. I also use the Hoberg-Phillips Fixed Industry Classification 
(FIC) data to calculate Alt_Comp (Hoberg and Phillips 2010; Hoberg and Phillips 2016).35 
Inferences are unchanged when I use FIC 50 or FIC 100. 
Untabulated results show that the higher the increase in Alt_Comp, the greater the 
increase in Informed. This adds to the construct validity of Alt_Comp and alludes to the 
theoretical channel between comparability and the number of informed investors. Furthermore, I 
change the unit of analysis to be an industry instead of a firm. Treat×Post in this specification is 
the mean of all firms’ Treat×Post in an industry quarter. Even though the number of observations 
decreases substantially (914 observations), the inferences in column 1 remain unchanged when 
using the alternative industry quarter sample. Specifically, the coefficient on Treat×Post is 0.54 
and is significant at the one percent level. Finally, I re-estimate columns 2 and 3 of Table 8 using 
Alt_Comp instead of Informed. Untabulated results show that inferences remain unchanged, i.e., 
the increase in liquidity is concentrated in the sample of firms that experience an increase in 
Alt_Comp. In summary, the evidence suggests that using an alternative proxy for comparability 
does not alter the main inference, i.e., that the implementation of the new revenue standard is 
associated with an increase in comparability and the increase in comparability is associated with 
an increase in liquidity. 
                                                 
35 TNIC industry data are available from the Hoberg-Phillips data library. 
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Effect on revenue attributes 
It is plausible that the new revenue standard could affect particular revenue attributes 
because the timing and amount of revenue recognition changes after the implementation of the 
standard. An increase in particular revenue attributes provides additional evidence that the 
implementation of the standard is associated with an increase in liquidity because prior literature 
finds a positive association between particular earnings attributes and liquidity (Affleck-Graves 
et al. 2002; Bhattacharya et al. 2012; Lang et al. 2012). 
I examine three revenue attributes: persistence, predictability, and smoothness (Francis et 
al. 2004). Persistence is the coefficient on Revenuet-1 when Revenue is regressed on Revenuet-1. 
A larger (smaller) coefficient implies more (less) persistence. I interact Treat×Post with 
Revenuet-1 to determine the incremental effect of the new revenue standard on persistence. 
Predictability is the negative of the natural log of the standard deviation of the residual from the 
aforementioned equation. Large (small) values of predictability imply more (less) predictable 
revenue. Smoothness is the negative of the natural log of the standard deviation of Revenue 
divided by the standard deviation of cash flow from operations. Large (small) values of 
smoothness imply more (less) revenue smoothness. 
Untabulated results show that revenue persistence, predictability, and smoothness 
increase after the implementation of the new revenue standard. Specifically, the coefficient on 
the Treat×Post×Revenuet-1 is 0.02 and is significant at the one percent level. The coefficient on 
Treat×Post when Predictability (Smoothness) is regressed on Treat×Post is 0.25 (0.11) and is 
significant at the one percent level. Therefore, the evidence suggests that the implementation of 




CHAPTER 6. CONCLUSION 
I investigate the liquidity effect of the implementation of the new revenue recognition 
standard using a staggered difference-in-differences design. Analytical work shows that the 
implementation of standards can affect liquidity through either the precision channel, i.e., the 
change in the accounting report’s ability to reflect economic events, the comparability channel, 
i.e., the increase in comparability across reporting entities, or both. Analytical work also shows 
that an increase (decrease) in either precision or comparability will lead to an increase (decrease) 
in liquidity, and therefore the net effect on liquidity is dependent on the change of both precision 
and comparability (Barth et al. 1999; Gao et al. 2019).  
I show that the implementation of the new revenue standard increases liquidity. I perform 
various analyses to mitigate concerns that other factors cause the increase in liquidity. I then 
show that firms that implement the standard first experience an increase in liquidity relative to 
firms that implement the standard at a later stage and that this liquidity difference decreases as 
more firms implement the standard. This liquidity difference is insignificantly different from 
zero once all firms implement the standard. 
I further show that both precision and comparability increase after the implementation of 
the new revenue standard. I also find that firms that experience an increase in either precision or 
comparability experience an increase in liquidity, but that firms that experience an increase in 
neither precision nor comparability do not experience an increase in liquidity. I use path analysis 
to show that the increase in liquidity is attributable to both the precision and comparability 
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channel. Lastly, I use an alternative proxy for comparability and show that my inferences remain 
unchanged when I use the alternative proxy. 
I contribute to the literature by providing early evidence of the capital market effects of 
the implementation of the new revenue standard. I provide evidence on the theoretically 
motivated channels through which the implementation of the accounting standard affects 
liquidity. I also show that increases in precision or comparability are associated with increases in 
liquidity and that some firms do not experience an increase in liquidity. The interaction between 
the precision and comparability channel could be of particular interest to standard setters as it 
shows, consistent with theory, that new standards can not only increase comparability, but also 
change the precision with which accounting reports reflect economic events. In addition, the fact 
that both these constructs have liquidity effects provides insights potentially relevant to standard 
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Figure 4. Path analysis: Additional paths 
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics 
              







Treat×Post 24,675 0.446 0 0 1 0.497 
Amihud 24,675 1.100 0.003 0.024 0.330 3.450 
Bid_ask 24,675 0.504 0.031 0.109 0.563 0.849 
SD_returnst-4 24,675 -3.806 -4.203 -3.865 -3.441 0.555 
Sizet-4 24,675 6.616 5.040 6.620 8.086 2.150 
Turnovert-4 24,675 -5.498 -6.035 -5.307 -4.777 1.131 
ROA 24,675 -0.021 -0.014 0.003 0.016 0.087 
MB 24,675 3.354 1.248 2.054 3.995 7.361 
Leverage 24,675 0.241 0.040 0.189 0.370 0.238 
Q_return 24,675 0.016 -0.106 0.012 0.123 0.240 
Loss 24,675 0.360 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.480 
SI 24,675 -0.003 -0.002 0.000 0.000 0.013 
Analyst 24,675 5.566 1 4 8 5.778 
              
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for variables used in the analyses. All variables are defined in the 
Appendix. Note that Amihud and Bid_ask are not yet multiplied by negative one and are the variables 
before taking the natural log. Amihud (Bid_ask) is multiplied by 107 (100) in this Table for ease of 







Table 2. Correlation matrix 























1.00                         
Amihud 0.03* 1.00                       
Bid_ask 0.02* 0.93* 1.00                     
SD_return
st-4 
-0.01* -0.48* -0.49* 1.00                   
Sizet-4 0.03* 0.93* 0.87* -0.54* 1.00                 
Turnovert-4 0.05* 0.60* 0.56* 0.12* 0.47* 1.00               
ROA -0.01* 0.33* 0.35* -0.46* 0.35* -0.03* 1.00             
MB 0.01 0.15* 0.14* -0.01* 0.13* 0.08* -0.01* 1.00           
Leverage 0.01 0.17* 0.14* 0.01* 0.19* 0.19* -0.01 -0.06* 1.00         
Q_return -0.01* 0.10* 0.09* -0.05* 0.04* -0.02* 0.12* 0.01 -0.03* 1.00       
Loss -0.00 -0.36* -0.37* 0.52* -0.36* 0.05* -0.58* 0.02* 0.03* -0.11* 1.00     




1.00   





                            




Table 3. Liquidity effect of implementation 
                
 𝐿𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑦_𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽1𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡 × 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡 + 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝜇𝑖 + 𝛾𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡  (1) 
                
Variables Amihud Bid_Ask Liquidity Amihud Bid_Ask Liquidity   
                
Treat×Post 0.09*** 0.05*** 0.03*** 0.10*** 0.05*** 0.03***   
  (3.86) (3.56) (4.18) (4.13) (3.56) (4.31)   
SD_returnst-4       0.06*** 0.01 0.01**   
        (3.20) (0.57) (2.05)   
Sizet-4       0.03 0.01 0.01   
        (1.00) (0.40) (0.75)   
Turnovert-4       -0.02 0.02** 0.00   
        (-1.50) (2.00) (0.44)   
ROA       0.43** 0.20* 0.13**   
        (2.38) (1.95) (2.37)   
MB       0.01*** 0.00*** 0.00***   
        (5.50) (4.64) (5.45)   
Leverage       -0.89*** -0.44*** -0.28***   
        (-6.52) (-4.87) (-6.02)   
Q_return       0.15*** 0.03* 0.03***   
        (6.31) (1.82) (4.33)   
Loss       -0.11*** -0.04*** -0.03***   
        (-7.26) (-3.51) (-5.68)   
SI       -0.10 0.51 0.14   
        (-0.18) (1.41) (0.75)   
Analyst       0.02*** 0.01*** 0.01***   
        (4.76) (4.44) (5.24)   
                
Observations 24,675 24,675 24,675 24,675 24,675 24,675   
R2 0.972 0.950 0.970 0.973 0.950 0.971   
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes   
Month-year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes   
Cluster Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm   
                
This table presents regression summary statistics for the estimation of Equation (1). t-statistics are presented 
in parentheses. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. The superscript 




Table 4. Parallel trends assumption 
        
𝐿𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽1𝐵𝑒𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑒_𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2 𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟_𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑡 + 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝜇𝑖 + 𝛾𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 (5) 
        
𝐿𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽1𝐵𝑒𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑡−3 + 𝛽2𝐵𝑒𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑡−2 + 𝛽3𝐵𝑒𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽4𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑡+1 + 𝛽5𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑡+2 +
𝛽6𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑡+3 + 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝜇𝑖 + 𝛾𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 (6) 
    
Variables Liquidity Liquidity   
        
Before_all 0.00     
  (0.20)     
After_all 0.03***     
  (4.34)     
Beforet-3   0.00   
    (0.20)   
Beforet-2   0.00   
    (0.22)   
Beforet-1   -0.01   
    (-1.21)   
Aftert+1   0.03***   
    (4.08)   
Aftert+2   0.03**   
    (2.58)   
Aftert+3   0.05**   
    (2.28)   
        
Observations 24,675 24,675   
R2 0.971 0.971   
Firm FE Yes Yes   
Month-year FE Yes Yes   
Cluster Firm Firm   
Controls Yes Yes   
        
This table presents regression summary statistics for the estimation of Equations (5) and (6). t-statistics are 
presented in parentheses. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. The superscript 




Table 5. Reversal of differences 
      
𝐿𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽1𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑠𝑡_𝑎𝑑𝑜𝑝𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑠 × 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑐ℎ2017𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑠𝑡_𝑎𝑑𝑜𝑝𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑠 × 𝐽𝑢𝑛𝑒2017𝑖𝑡 +
𝛽3𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑠𝑡_𝑎𝑑𝑜𝑝𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑠 × 𝑆𝑒𝑝𝑡𝑒𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟2017𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽4𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑠𝑡_𝑎𝑑𝑜𝑝𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑠 × 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑐ℎ2018𝑖𝑡 +
𝛽5𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑠𝑡_𝑎𝑑𝑜𝑝𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑠 × 𝐽𝑢𝑛𝑒2018𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽6𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑠𝑡_𝑎𝑑𝑜𝑝𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑠 × 𝑆𝑒𝑝𝑡𝑒𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟2018𝑖𝑡 +
𝛽7𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑠𝑡_𝑎𝑑𝑜𝑝𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑠 × 𝐷𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟2018𝑖𝑡 + 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝜇𝑖 + 𝛾𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡  (7) 
  
      
Variable Liquidity   
      
First_adopters×March2017 -0.005   
  (-0.40)   
First_adopters×June2017 -0.003   
  (-0.27)   
First_adopters×September2017 -0.012   
  (-1.36)   
First_adopters×March2018 0.031***   
  (3.84)   
First_adopters×June2018 0.029**   
  (2.41)   
First_adopters×September2018 0.026   
  (1.59)   
First_adopters×December2018 0.011   
  (0.61)   
      
Observations 22,411   
R2 0.970   
Firm FE Yes   
Month-year FE Yes   
Cluster Firm   
Controls Yes   
      
This table presents regression summary statistics for the estimation of Equation (7). t-statistics are presented in 
parentheses. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. The superscript asterisks *, 






Table 6. Precision analysis 
                    
 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡 = 𝜆1𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡 × 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡 + 𝜇𝑖 + 𝛾𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡  (2) 










Column number (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)   
                    
Treat×Post 0.10*** 0.29*** 0.02** 0.10*** 0.11*** 0.10*** 0.20*** 0.01   
  (7.53) (14.41) (2.13) (7.39) (8.22) (7.59) (11.84) (0.83)   
  
        
  
Observations 23,111 23,111 24,461 23,303 23,285 22,920 20,183 23,708   
R2 0.921 0.974 0.793 0.920 0.920 0.920 0.915 0.920   
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes   
Month-year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes   




      Price Cash flow        
Alternate 
estimation 
          Industry       






                    
This table presents regression summary statistics for the estimation of Equation (2) and various versions thereof. t-statistics are presented in parentheses. All 
continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. The superscript asterisks *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 
1% levels, respectively.  
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Table 7. Informed investors analysis 
              
 𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡 = 𝜃1𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡 × 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡 + 𝜇𝑖 + 𝛾𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡  (3) 
              
Variables Informed Informed Informed Informed Informed   
Column number (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)   
              
Treat×Post 0.03*** 0.04*** -0.00 0.02*** 0.03***   
  (3.54) (2.94) (-0.49) (3.04) (3.51)   
Precision       -0.01     
        (-1.18)     
Liqt-1       0.34***     
        (23.26)     
Treat×Post×Relative_size         0.01**   
          (2.05)   
              
Observations 21,704 18,944 21,381 20,251 18,967   
R2 0.983 0.982 0.977 0.985 0.982   
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes   
Month-year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes   
Cluster Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm   





      
              
This table presents regression summary statistics for the estimation of Equation (3) and various versions 
thereof. t-statistics are presented in parentheses. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th 
percentiles. The superscript asterisks *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% 






Table 8. Cross-sectional analysis 
 
𝐿𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽1𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡 × 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡 + 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝜇𝑖 + 𝛾𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡  (8) 
                  

















Column number (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)   
                  
Treat×Post 0.01 0.01 0.03*** 0.00 0.05*** -0.01 0.07***   
  (1.39) (0.40) (2.96) (0.01) (3.71) (-0.50) (4.65)   
Precision 0.08***     0.09*** 0.06***       
  (11.83)     (9.51) (5.26)       
Informed 0.35*** 0.42*** 0.50***           
  (8.35) (5.50) (6.49)           
                  
Observations 20,571 8,199 9,552 9,132 8,720 4,433 4,931   
R2 0.978 0.981 0.973 0.978 0.970 0.980 0.965   
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes   
Month-year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes   
Cluster Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm   
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes   
                  
This table presents regression summary statistics for the estimation of Equation (8) and various versions thereof. t-statistics are presented in parentheses. All 
continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. The superscript asterisks *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 






Table 9. Path analysis 
        
Variable Liquidity   
        
Precision Channel       
λ1[Treat×Post, Precision] 0.107***     
  (7.70)     
β2[Precision, Liquidity] 0.084***     
  (11.87)     
Total precision channel 0.009 
 
  
Precision channel percentage   45%   
        
Comparability Channel       
θ1[Treat×Post, Informed] 0.030***     
  (3.60)     
β3[Informed, Liquidity] 0.360***     
  (8.64)     
Total comparability channel 0.011    
Comparability channel percentage   55%   
        
Direct channel 0.009     
β1[Treat×Post, Liquidity] (1.13)     
        
        
Sum of all significant channels 0.020     
Total percentage   100%   
        
Observations 20,591     
Firm FE Yes     
Month-year FE Yes     
Cluster Firm     
        
This table presents regression summary statistics for the path analysis estimation (Equations (2), (3), and (8)). 
t-statistics are presented in parentheses. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. 





APPENDIX 1. VARIABLE DEFINITIONS 
Amihud 
The negative of the natural log of the quarterly median of the 
daily Amihud (2002) measure of illiquidity, calculated using 
the unsigned stock return divided by USD trading volume. 
Bid_ask 
The negative of the natural log of the quarterly median of the 
daily quoted spreads, calculated using the daily closing bid 
and ask prices divided by the midpoint. 
Liquidity 
A common factor that explains common variation between 
Amihud and Bid_ask. 
Liquidity_variable Either Amihud, Bid_ask, or Liquidity. 
Treat×Post 
Equals one if the quarterly or annual report has been prepared 
using the new revenue standard, zero otherwise. 
SD_returnst–4 
The natural log of the quarterly standard deviation of daily 
returns, lagged by one year. 
Sizet–4 
The natural log of the market value of equity, lagged by one 
year. 
Turnovert–4 
The natural log of the quarterly median of daily turnover, 
calculated as the volume of shares traded divided by the 
number of shares outstanding, lagged by one year. 
ROA Income before extraordinary items scaled by assets. 
MB Market value of equity to book value of equity. 
Leverage Book value of total debt to book value of total assets. 
Q_return Buy and hold returns over the quarter. 
Loss An indicator equal to one if the firm is a loss firm. 
SI Special items scaled by total assets. 
Analyst The number of analysts providing revenue forecasts. 
Precision_residual 
The natural log of the reciprocal of the standard deviation of 
the residual from Equation (4). 
Precision_returns 
The natural log of the reciprocal of the standard deviation of 
daily returns over the quarter. 
Precision 
The common factor that explains common variation between 




Informed The natural log of the number of institutional investors. 
Revenue Revenue for the quarter. 
Returns Buy and hold over the same period as Revenue. 
Before_all 
An indicator variable equal to one for all periods before the 
implementation of the new revenue standard. 
After_all 
An indicator variable equal to one for all periods after the 
implementation of the new revenue standard. 
Beforeit–n (Afterit+n) The n periods before (after) the fiscal year-end. 
Trend 
The number of quarters relative to the reference period, i.e., 
the period before the implementation of the standard. 
First_adopters 
Firms with a December fiscal year-end and were, therefore, 
the first to implement the standard. 
March2017 to December2018 
Indicator variables that equal one if the fiscal quarter ends on 
that specific date. 
NonDec 
An indicator variable that equals one if the firm has a non-
December fiscal year-end. 
Material 
An indicator variable that equals one if the firm was 
substantively affected by the implementation of the new 
revenue standard. 
Num_sh The number of shareholders. 
Relative_size 







An alternative measure of comparability calculated as 
1
𝐽
 ×  ∑ |𝛽1𝑖𝜔 − 𝛽1𝑗𝜔|
𝐽
𝑗=1  , where 𝛽1𝑖𝜔 (𝛽1𝑗𝜔) is the coefficient 
on Returns from estimating Equation (4) for industry i (j) in 
period 𝜔, J is the number of industries excluding industry i, 
and 𝜔 represents one of two distinct periods, i.e., the pre- or 
post-implementation period. 
Persistence 
The coefficient on Revenuet-1 when Revenue is regressed on 
Revenuet-1. 
Predictability 
The negative of the natural log of the standard deviation of the 





The negative of the natural log of the standard deviation of 
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